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Case and Comment
SE R V IC E  our O F  1U E  JU R ISD IC T IO N  IN T O R T  ACTION S—
LO C U S O F T O R T  — SPEC IA L R U LE IN N E W  BR U N SW IC K — 
E X E R C IS E  O F  D ISC R E T IO N
Applications for an order for service out of the jurisdiction in a 
tort case can present vexing problems. This is especially true in fed­
eral countries such as Canada and the United States where there arc 
many “law districts”. The decision of McRuer C .J.II.C . in 
Jenner v. Sun Oil Co. L t d may serve as a focal point for a discussion 
of some of these problems. In that case allegedly defama­
tory radio broadcasts emanating from New York were heard in 
Ontario.- The plaintiff, an Ontario resident, brought an action in 
defamation in Ontario against a number of defendants. These de­
fendants, individuals and limited companies, were resident in Ontario, 
New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland and the District of Columbia. An 
order for service out of the jurisdiction was sought on the grounds that 
the action was a tort committed within Ontario and that a person out of 
Ontario was a necessary or proper partv to the action properly brought 
against another person duly served within Ontario. Tne above arc 
grounds inter alia under which the Ontario Rules of Court permit 
service out of the jurisdiction. There are identical provisions in the 
Rules of the Supreme Court of New' Brunswick.3
The granting of the order on the ground that a party defendant 
properlv served within the jurisdiction was a necessary or proper party 
was not considered, as the matter was disposed of on the ground that 
this w;as a tort committed within Ontario.4
An obstacle in the way of finding that there was a tort committed 
within the jurisdiction was George M onro Ltd. v. American Cyanamid 
and Chem ical Corp.;' a decision of the English Court of Appeal. There 
a negligent act was committed in the State of New' York in the manu­
facturing process with the resulting damage occurring in England. It 
was held that the tort was not committed in England when damage 
and nothing more occurs there. The judgment clid not go so far as 
to say that the tort must be wholly committed within the jurisdiction 
and in fact Scott L. J., expressly left that question open:
I express no opinion whether, if an act were committed out 
of the jurisdiction which did not give rise to a cause of action 
in tort until something further had happened within the 
jurisdiction, the resultant damage coidd properly be regarded
1. 119521 2 D .L .R . 526 (O n t.I.
2. A n in terestin g  discussion o f th is ty p e of to rt based on U. S . au th o rities  appears in
H arp er, " T o rt  C ases in th e C o n flict of L aw s,” il955 i 33 Can. B . Rev. 1155. at p
1169 et seq.
3. 0. 11, r. 1 i l l  <e ) and <g> of th e R u les of t ’.ie  Suprem e C ourt o f New B ru n sw ick .
4. On th is ground of serv ice  out o f th e  ju risd ic tio n  see T he R rabo, 119491 A. C. 326
and Pau l v. C h an dler & F ish e r L td ., 119241 2 D .L .R . 479 (O n t.I.
5. 119441 K . B . 432 (C. A .).
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as flowing from a tori taking placc within the jurisdiction.
It is not nccessary to decide that question in the present 
case.'1
Thus the first obstacle to finding that there was a tort committed 
in Ontario is disposed of quite easily. A number of other cases7 go as 
far as the Mo. case in holding that damage alone within the juris­
diction is not enough.
In Johnson v. Taylor BrothersN where the House of Lords had to 
decidc, on an application for external service, whether a breach of con­
tract occurred within England they said the test is whether it was 
“substantially” committed within the judisdiction rather than “wholly” 
or “solely”. W hile their Lordships were not directing their minds to 
torts it is submitted that the rules relating to breach of contract are 
identical in principle.
A leading authority for holding that the tort in the Jenner case was a 
tort committed within Ontario is Bata v. Bata9, a decision of the Eng­
lish Court of Appeal; Lord Justice Scott answered the question which 
he did not decide in the M onro case. A letter mailed from Switzer­
land to England containing defamatory statements was held to be a 
tort committed within England on the ground that the material part 
of the cause of action in libel is not the writing but the publication. 
Unfortunately this case is not fully reported, appearing only as a head- 
note in the Weekly Notes. The facts in Bata v. Bata would appear to 
be on all fours with those in the Jenner  case. The only discernible 
difference, which seems immaterial in deciding where a tort is com­
mitted, being between the written and the spoken word.
Publication in defamation appears to be analogous to the negligent 
act or omission in negligence and publication occurs not on the speak­
ing of the defamatory words but on the hearing of them. This is not 
to say that speaking is not a part of publication; it may be that pub­
lication consists of Doth the speaking and hearing. However it would 
not follow that the facts in tne lenncr case did not amount to a tort 
committed within Ontario for the following reasons: (1) the hearing 
of the defamatory statements occurred there; (2) the hearing would 
appear to be a “substantial” commission of the tort; (3) there is no 
requirement that the tort be “wholly” or “solely” committed within 
Ontario; and (4) Bata v. Bata being in point there appears to be no 
reason for departing from that authority. The leamea Chief Justice’s 
finding that tne tort was committed in Ontario therefore seems amply 
warranted.
6. Ibid., a t  p. 437.
7. Paul v. C handler A Fisher L td ., [ 1924 1 2 D .L.R . 479 (O n t.) ; Beck v. W illard C hocolate
Co., 11924] 2 D .L .R . 1140 (N. S. Sup. C t .i ;  A nderson v. Nobels Explosive C o., (1906)
12 O .L .R . 644 (O nt. Div. C t.).
8. 119201 A . C. 144.
9. [1948] W. N. 366 (C . A .) .
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In New Brunswick, in addition to the enumerated grounds which 
include the two referred to above, it is provided:
Service may also be allowed where the action is for any other 
matter and it appears to the satisfaction of the Court or a 
Judge that the plaintiff has any good cause of action against 
the defendant and that it is in the interest of justice that the 
same should be tried in this jurisdiction; . . . 10
This provision was interpreted by the Court of Appeal in Roy v. 
Saint John  Lum ber Com pany.11 W hite J., speaking for the 
majority (Grimmer J., concurring without reasons; Crockett }., dis­
senting), said “any other matter’ included those matters over which 
the Court had jurisdiction to order service ex juris before the coming 
into force of the Judicature Act and which were not specifically in­
cluded in the enumeration of matters in the new Order 11. Since 
contracts made in the Province the breach of which occurred outside 
had formerly been a ground for service abroad,12 service out of the 
jurisdiction was granted. However before the coming into force of 
the Judicature Act service out of the jurisdiction was not permitted in 
the case of torts committed without the Province. There is however 
a very recent New Brunswick case,13 decided this year by Michaud
C .J.Q .B .D ., in which he found that an automobile accident in Que­
bec is a proper subject to be brought within 0. 11, r. 1 (2). It is under­
stood that tnis case is on appeal; for that reason no comment will be 
made here.
Service out of the jurisdiction was unknown at common law; it is 
statutory in origin. It is prima facie an interference with the jurisdic­
tion of a foreign power; the rules which provide for such service use 
the permissive “may” rather than the mandatory “shall”. A discretion 
is given which must be exercised judicially. Tnis is the spirit of the 
law referred to in the M onro case where it was said that the facts must 
come within the “spirit” as well as the “letter” of the rule. In the 
Jenner case the learned Chief Justice having found that the facts came 
within the “letter” of the rule was reauirea to examine its “spirit” to 
determine whether the discretion had been exercised accordingly.
It is said that if there is any doubt whether the discretion should 
be exercised it should be resolved in favour of the foreigner.14 The 
circumstances surrounding the action must be viewed to determine 
whether any doubt exists.
10. 0. 11, r. 1 (2) of the Rules of th e  Suprem e C ourt of New Brunsw ick . F orm erly
0. 11, r . 1 (h ).
11. (1916) 44 N .B .R . 88 (C. A .) .
12. S. 52 of the Suprem e C ourt A ct, C hapter 110, Consolidated S tatu tes of
New B runsw ick 1903. The grounds un der w hich service  out of th e  jurisdiction
m ight be gran ted  w ere w here “a cause of action  w hich arose w ithin the Jurisdiction,
or in resp ect of a b reach  of a co n tract m ade wholly or In part w ithin the ju risd ic­
tion, or in respect of any  co n tract execu ted , or to be execu ted . In w hole or In
part w ithin the Ju risdiction ."
13. King v. Paradis [1956] N. B ., Q .B.D . (U n rep ortfld).
14. The “ H a te n ” , [1908] P . 189 (C. A .).
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Examination of the cases discloses no analysis of the basis for ex­
ercising the discretion. The learned Chief Justice speaks only of the 
forum  conveniens as an important element. Slesser L. J., said in 
K roch v. Rossell et cie 15:
Hut ihc fact that the case might be tried in this country, 
and might be within the jurisdiction, is not necessarily a 
sufficient reason for allowing leave to be given to serve out of 
the jurisdiction. The various matters which have to be con­
sidered have been constantly before the courts, the question of 
the convenenience of the forum, the question of under which 
laws, such questions as the place where the evidence 
may more regularly be obtained, where the case may 
more conveniently be heard, and a numlier of other con­
siderations, which it is perhaps unwise to attempt to define 
in any particular manner.!«
The above quotation hardly indicates a real attempt to analyze 
the constituent elements of the discretion. Indeed all the various mat­
ters referred to would seem to be contained in the term forum  
conveniens .
As regards the forum conveniens it is of importance that the 
plaintiff in the Jenner case sought vindication of his reputation and 
the trving of the cause in Ontario would give him the widest publicity 
in the area where his reputation may be said to be located. In thé 
K roch  case a French resident sought to sue in England because of 
certain defamatory statements contained in a Belgian and a French 
newspaper which had been circulated in a small number in England. 
Slesser L. J. said:
I quite agree with Mr. Slade that, if there were evidence in a 
particular case that a person had a reputation in this country 
to be defamed, or was known here, or traded here, or had 
professional or social connections, it might be that the circu­
lation of a very few copies might do him very serious or 
irreparable harm. It is certainly an element to be taken into
consideration.17
The material for the broadcasts was apparently gathered in Ont­
ario. The hearing of the case in Ontario would facilitate the present­
ing of evidence should the defendants seek to justify. Also the wit­
nesses who heard the publications complained of would be best able 
to testify in Ontario.
Lord Justice Slesser alluded to the choice of law as a matter to be 
considered in the exercise of the discretion. Since the finding is that 
the facts constituted a tort committed within the jurisdiction, the 
lex loci delicti commissi and the lex fori coincide if tne case is tried 
in Ontario.
15l 11937) 1 A ll E .R . 725 (C. A .I .
16. Ibid.. a t p. 727.
17. Ibid., at p. 729.
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The possibility of realizing on a judgment obtained might be a 
factor in the exercise of the discretion sincc a judgment would be an 
empty one could no assets be reached either directly or indirectly. 
Certain English legislation provides for the setting aside of a service 
out of the jurisdiction under such circumstances.18 However this was 
not material in the Jnnw r  case because one of the defendants was 
resident in Ontario.
Another factor which seems worthy of consideration is the lack of 
an alternative forum con ien irn s . Of the parties only one resided in 
New York from whence the defamatory broadcasts originated and the 
matter might be said to be not one of “substance” in New York. The 
tort seemed most intimately connected with Ontario: the statements 
were heard there, the material for the broadcasts was gathered there, 
the reputation sought to be vindicated was located there and two of 
the parties resided there. It is difficult to conclude other than that 
the discretion was properly exercised.
The applicability of the above principles to the law of New Bruns­
wick should be examined. In the Roy  case Barry }., from whose deci­
sion an appeal was taken, expressed some doubt whether he should 
exercise his discretion. In the light of T ’ir '‘Hagen” case one would 
have thought doubt should be resolved in favour of the foreigner. The 
headnote to the Roy  case reads in part:
Per curtain, where under clause (h) a judge in the 
exercise of his discretion on the facts decides that it is in the 
interest of justice that jurisdiction should be exercised and 
service abroad authorized, the Court on appeal will not in­
terfere with the exercise of such discretion.!»
The reporter must have based this comment on the argument of 
counsel for the plaintiff as it nowhere appears in the judgments in the 
Court of Appeal. In fact W hite J., spealcing for the majority, said:
The decision of the question we are called upon to determine 
in this matter depends upon the extent of the power con­
ferred upon the Court or a judge by clause (h) of 0. 11, r, 1, 
and not upon any consideration as to whether, assuming the 
learned judge had a discretionary power to make the order 
appealed from, he exercised that discretion just as we would 
have done upon the same facts.-'»
In the Roy appeal there was no consideration in the judgments 
of the circumstances under which the discretion ought to be exercised 
except that Mr. Justice W hite expressed the opinion that stricter 
limits should be observed under clause (h) than under the specific 
clauses (a) to (g). The proper manner of dealing with an exercised 
discretion on an appeal would seem to be as stated by Fullerton J. A. 
in Nemerovsky v. M cBride.
18. See Goff v. Goff, [1934] P . 107.
19. (1916) 44 N .B.R . 88.
20. Ibid., at p. 116.
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The rule, as I understand it. is that the Court of Appeal will 
not interfere with an order made by a Judge in the exercise 
of his discretion unless he has proceeded on some wrong prin­
ciple, which is not the case here.-'
It should be noted that this statement is quite different from the 
portion of the headnotc quoted above.
In King v. Paradis Chief Justice Michaud apparently exercised his 
discretion on the sole ground that several of tne witnesses were resi­
dent in New Brunswick and did not discuss the propriety of this exer­
cise 011 the motion to set aside the order because, he stated, it was not 
questioned.
J. W . McManus, III Law, U.N.B.
21. 119241 3 D .L.R . 103, at p. 104 (M an. C. A .i.
ASSAULT — AGREEMENT TO “FIGHT IT OUT”— 
RIGHT TO RECOVER DAMAGES — EX TURPI CAUSA — 
VOLENTI NON FIT INJURIA
The plaintiff and defendant, who had been drinking in a tavern, 
tiuarrcllcd and agreed to go outside and settle their differences with 
tlicir fists. The plaintiff, knocked down by a blow to the head, suffer­
ed a couple of broken teeth, cuts on his face and a fractured ankle. He 
claimcd damages for assault. The defendant denied the assault, alleging 
that the plaintiff was the assailant and that reasonable force only was 
used in self-protection. Held, for the defendant.W ade v. Martin. [1955] 
3 D .L.R. 635 (Nfld.).
This case was decided on two grounds, each embodied in a Latin 
maxim: (1) ex turpi causa non oritur actio; and (2) volenti non fit 
injuria. In regard to the former, the trial judge said the fight was a 
breach of the peace; that it was “indeed criminal”. Consent of the 
parties to participate in the fracas could not render it innocent because 
‘ ‘No person can license another to commit a crime’. . . Nor can anyone 
lawfully consent to bodily harm, save for some reasonable purpose: for 
example, a proper surgical operation or manly sports.”1
In T he Queen v. Coney, Mathew, J. said: “It was said, that be­
cause of the consent of the combatants to fight there could not be 
an assault, . . . The contention really meant that the agreement of the 
men to fight rendered the contest lawful and innocent. There is, how­
ever, abundant authority for saying that no consent can render that 
innocent which is in fact dangerous.”2 And in Rex v. Donovan, Swift,
1. Salm on d on T orts (11th. ed. 1953 ) 42.
2. (1881-2) 8 Q .B. 534, a t  pp. 546 and 547.
